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ABSTRACT 
The world is facing challenges with climate change. People are willing to advocate a good 
cause and fight against rising temperatures, as well as many societal and governmental 
issues. This has created a demand for more sustainable investment solutions and solid 
CSR practices. Therefore, socially responsible investing (SRI) has become very popular 
during recent years, for example, the US is capturing every fifth dollar invested under 
professional management.  
 
In this study, three Nordic (Danish, Finnish, Swedish) stock portfolios are constructed: 
an environmentally, socially and governmentally (ESG) responsible portfolio and its 
matched conventional counterpart (non–ESG) and a Nordic large cap portfolio as a 
benchmark. These portfolios are examined to find any differences in the performance. 
The methods used are the CAPM and the Fama–French five factor model. The time period 
is split according to the financial crisis to see if there are any differences in performance 
during the crisis or normal times.  
 
Two hypotheses are tested. Firstly, some of the previous studies suggest that ESG stocks 
act as a buffer in an economic downturn. The first hypothesis is in accordance. However, 
only weak evidence can be found to support the hypothesis that the ESG portfolio 
performs better in comparison to the conventional one during the financial crisis. Thus, 
the first hypothesis can be rejected due to the lack of statistical significance.  
 
Secondly, many studies find the investment universe of the SRI investors to be limited, 
which may lead to lower profits. Therefore, the second hypothesis examines whether the 
conventional portfolio performs better compared to its responsible counterpart. It can be 
stated that at least during normal times, strong evidence can be found to support this 
hypothesis. The conventional portfolio yields an economically and statistically significant 
annual alpha of 7.7 percent for the whole time period examined, while the alpha for the 
ESG portfolio is smaller in size and not statistically significant.  
 
However, the results should be taken with precautions, since the alpha for the non–ESG 
portfolio is large and negative in the crisis period, although lacking the statistical 
significance. For further research, it might be beneficial to use weekly data in order to 
confirm the negative alpha for the crisis period and the possible shielding effect for the 
ESG portfolio during the crisis.  
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
KEYWORDS: Socially responsible investing, Responsible investing, Corporate social 
responsibility, Corporate social performance, Positive screening, Portfolio management. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The earth is under tremendous threat against global warming. The temperature in our 
planet is expected to rise by 2.5 to 10 Fahrenheit over the next century because of our 
actions. This will cause droughts, melting of the glaciers, rising of the sea level, extreme 
heat waves and many other severe problems (NASA 2017). Furthermore, given that most 
of the largest cities are grounded on a seaside, the thread is evident. As the environmental 
concerns have invaded our everyday life, investing is no exception. It is no wonder that 
socially responsible investing (SRI) has become more and more popular as the fight 
against climate change continues.   
Alongside environmental issues, SRI takes into account social and governmental aspects. 
It seems evident that investors are willing to advocate issues they consider important in 
their local community as well as in the national and the international level. Well planned 
environmental, social and governmental (ESG) practices have become an important way 
for corporations to show their concerns over these issues and simultaneously capture the 
interest of the investors looking for responsible companies to invest in, in the global stock 
market.  
There are many ways of evaluating the responsibility of a company. For example, the 
United Nations (UN) has created its own principles of responsible investing (PRI)1. The 
figure 1. illustrates the growth of signatories of these practices and the growth of the assets 
under management of the companies engaged. There has been a substantial growth in 
both, and today there are more than 1400 trillion US dollars invested worldwide using the 
PRI practices. (Principles of responsible investing 2016.)
                                                 
1 Principles of responsible investing (2016):  
1. We will incorporate ESG issues into investment analysis and decision-making processes. 
2. We will be active owners and incorporate ESG issues into our ownership policies and practices. 
3. We will seek appropriate disclosure on ESG issues by the entities in which we invest. 
4. We will promote acceptance and implementation of the Principles within the investment industry. 
5. We will work together to enhance our effectiveness in implementing the Principles. 
6. We will each report on our activities and progress towards implementing the Principles
. 
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Furthermore, in the US alone more than 8.72 trillion dollars under professional 
management are invested using SRI strategies. This means that in the US, more than every 
fifth dollar is invested in companies with decent ESG practices. The growth from 2014 
to 2016 was 33 percent. It is clear that the SRI industry is booming and the growth is most 
likely to continue in the future. (USSIF 2016.) 
1.1 Purpose of the study and hypotheses  
As socially responsible investing has become more popular, there has been an increase in 
supportive academic research. There are many US based studies, as well as European and 
even some Nordic studies in this field. Most studies try to find differences in profitability 
of the ESG and conventional stocks. For example, the study of Kempf and Osthoff (2007) 
focuses on performance of the responsible stocks compared to their counterparts. They 
create a strategy of buying stocks with high responsibility ratings based on the KLD 
Research Analytics and sell stocks with low ratings. This simple strategy yields 
significant returns of 8.7 percent annually.  
On the other hand Statman (2000) explores the difference of conventional and ESG stocks 
via index and mutual funds. The study finds that the Domini social index matches the 
performance of the S&P 500 between the years 1990–1998. During the same time, 
socially responsible mutual funds where worse off than the S&P 500 but no different than 
Figure 1. The growth of ESG investing. (Principles of responsible investing 2016.) 
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the conventional mutual funds. Overall, the study finds little difference between the 
conventional and ESG stocks.  
The study of Bello (2005) investigates the differences in characteristics of securities held, 
portfolio diversification and variable effects of diversification on investment performance 
between conventional and socially responsible mutual funds. The study does not find any 
significant differences between the two regarding any of these features. Moreover, both 
seem to underperform the S&P 500 and Domini 400 Social index for the sample time 
period from 1994 to 2001.   
Nevertheless, most studies regarding Nordic countries do not examine profitability. For 
example, the study of Bengtsson (2008 a) examines the history of SRI in the Nordic 
countries while Scholtens and Sievänen (2013) examine why Scandinavian countries may 
differ in their socially responsible investments. They find that SRI is not a general feature 
of an economy, however, some factors, such as size of the pension fund industry and 
openness of the economy, do matter as they create more demand for SRI. Also, societies 
with more “feminine” values, such as Norway and Sweden, are more at ease with SRI 
compared to the more “masculine” countries such as Finland.  
Moreover, Scholtens and Sievänen (2013) state that Denmark, Finland, Norway and 
Sweden share a similar government policy and a business community, both highly 
respected by many other countries. Furthermore, Nordic countries are ranked at the top 
of the Human development Index and the Environmental Performance Index year after 
year, making it interesting to know whether these countries also perform well regarding 
ESG aspects in the stock market. Also, La Porta, Lopez–de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008) 
note that these countries are very similar because of their Scandinavian civil law, leading 
to the institutional homogeneity, however, this also makes them different from countries 
based on French or German civil law, let alone a common law. 
Additionally, Bengtsson (2008 b) emphasizes the role of institutional factors making the 
Nordic countries homogenous, even though the SRI practices may vary within and 
between the countries. Thus, despite their differences, the Nordic countries are very 
similar in many ways, however, there does not seem to be research regarding profitability 
that covers these countries altogether. Moreover, the few studies that examine the SRI 
profitability have been done with funds. Such as the study of Rennebook (2008), which 
finds that conventional Swedish funds are a better investment than their responsible peers 
during the sample period of 1991 to 2003. Therefore, this study tries to fill this gap in the 
literature, examining the profitability of ESG stocks in the Nordic countries by 
constructing a Nordic ESG portfolio and its matched conventional counterpart.
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Despite this rather large body of academic research, no consensus has yet been achieved, 
and the profitability of ESG stocks in comparison to conventional ones remains 
unanswered. The purpose here is to examine if the ESG portfolio is more profitable than 
the conventional one. Factor regression analysis is used to examine the monthly returns 
of ESG stocks, and it is compared to that of a matched sample of conventional stocks. 
Then these two portfolios are examined throughout different time periods. The financial 
crisis is a natural breaking point for the time period examined. Thus, the final sample is 
divided in three sub–periods: the crisis; and times preceding, and following it.  
The results of previous research regarding profitability of ESG stocks is mixed, but most 
studies find no significant difference the performance2. For example, Kreander, Gray, 
Power and Sinclair (2005) explore ethical funds from 40 different European countries and 
find no significant difference in the returns compared to the conventional funds. However, 
some studies indicate that ESG stocks may perform better during a crisis period in 
comparison to conventional stocks3. For example, Ducassy (2013) finds that there is a 
positive relationship with the corporate social performance and the financial performance 
in the beginning of financial crisis for French listed companies. Furthermore, there are 
also many studies concluding that one is better than the other, ESG stocks especially have 
been seen to underperform the conventional stocks in the long run4.  
This can be at least partly explained by the non–financial gains of SRI and restricted 
investment possibilities. For example, if most companies fail to meet the strict rules of 
environmental, social and governmental aspects, the investment universe can be very 
limited, and the investor is left with few options which automatically limit the possible 
combinations of stocks, and thus the potential upsides. Hence, following hypothesis are 
formed and tested in the study: 
Hypotheses 1: ESG stocks act as a buffer during financial crisis, mitigating possible 
losses. 
                                                 
2See for example. Bello (2005); Hamilton & Statman (1993); Huimin & Roca (2010); Schröder (2005); 
Statman (2000); Statman & Meir (2006) and Kreander et al. (2005). More information from these studies 
is in the literature review.  
 
3See for example. Ducassy (2013); Godfrey, Merrill & Hansen (2009); Kim, Li & Li (2014); Mitton 
(2002). More information from these studies is in the literature review.  
 
4The conventional stocks are better: See for example. Areal, Cortez & Silva (2009); Brammer, Brooks 
and Pavelin (2006); Horst & Thang (2008); Leite & Cortez (2014).  
The ESG stocks are better: See for example. El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok & Mishra (2011); Kempf 
&Osthoff (2007). More information from these studies is in the literature review. 
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Furthermore, overall profitability is examined in the second hypothesis for both portfolios. 
As there seems to be slightly more studies concluding that the non–ESG stocks might be 
more profitable than vice versa, the second hypothesis is made accordingly.  
Hypotheses 2: The Non–ESG portfolio is more profitable than the ESG portfolio. 
Thus, the two hypothesis are examined with the portfolios constructed for this purpose 
from the Nordic stocks.  
1.2 Structure of the study 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section two, a brief history of SRI is 
introduced along with the key strategies of SRI. Section three consists of a literature 
review of several studies relating to the topic. The fourth section consists of the theoretical 
background. Also, the used assets pricing models are introduced. Section five introduces 
the data and methodology used in the empirical part of the paper. The sixth section 
presents the empirical results of the study, as well as the robustness checks. The final 
section consists of the conclusions, where findings of the study are summed up and 
discussed. Also, the possible caveats of the study and ideas for further research are 
introduced.  
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2. SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING 
Socially responsible investing can be seen from many different perspectives5 and usually 
each has its own way to define it. Green investing is a perspective taken by many 
environmentalists, whilst corporate social performance (CSP) is more societally oriented. 
SRI can be also seen as process that seeks not only financial profits but also environmental 
and social returns, also known as the “triple bottom line” (Hawken 2004). In this study, 
the environmental, social and governmental (ESG) approach is used, covering all three 
major parts, each of which can be further divided in subcategories. (Beal & Phillips 2005; 
USSIF 2014.) 
Regardless of the definition, SRI aims to invest in a responsible manner that is profitable 
but still takes a stand in different societal aspects, usually including at least one of the 
ESG components. SRI is also closely related to corporate social responsibility (CSR) as 
investments tend to flow in companies with superior CSR practices, and companies 
lacking these might be excluded from funding. However, where CSR is more of a concern 
for the companies, SRI is that of private and institutional investors. Ultimately, SRI can 
be seen as a part of three components: financial gains of the investment, non–financial 
gains, and the change in the society brought by the investment. (Barnett & Salomon 2012; 
Beal & Phillips 2005.) 
Furthermore, firms that have good quality CSR tend to outperform their peers, at least 
according to a meta–analysis of Orlitzky, Schmidt and Rynes (2004), which concludes that 
companies with enhanced CSP have also higher financial performance. However, it may be 
also that unless significant efforts are made regarding CSP, no financial gains are attained or 
even vice versa, as Barnett and Salomon (2012) discover the relationship between the CSP 
and corporate financial performance to be U–shaped. This is also why in this study the top of 
the class firms are used. Moreover, good CSR is also linked to lower cost of capital, which 
may be seen as a lower risk for these firms.  
To understand all aspects of SRI, it is useful to examine utility of the investments from a 
perspective of an individual. The utility function in figure 2. illustrates the benefits of 
investing in an ethical or unethical investment. It is important to note that the investor is 
better off investing in an ethical way than not participating as the utility is higher. Also, 
the investor is worse off with an unethical investment than not participating, regardless 
of the outcome of the investment. (Beal & Phillips 2005.) 
                                                 
5Also known as social investing, green investing, responsible investing and sustainable investing. 
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The utility of ethical investments is therefore a sum of financial and mental gains. To 
understand the mental gains, the following procedure can be used. First, the ethical 
investment creates a kind of enjoyment, which is similar to that of gamblers’ joy when 
they are participating in a game. Secondly, the level of perceived ethicality is added to 
the utility of an investment as it affects the investment decision. Lastly, the emotional 
gains of investing in an ethical investment are compared to that of other actions, such as 
watching television or playing sports. The idea behind this theory is closely related to 
behavioral finance and it relies on the fact that gamblers receive a certain amount of 
satisfaction just by participating in a game. Thus, in a similar manner just by participating 
in an ethical investment, the investor is rewarded. (Beal & Phillips 2005.) 
2.1 History of SRI 
The origins of SRI can be seen in Jewish laws as the religion prohibited investing in 
industries or companies, which were harmful or considered sinister in any way. In this 
Figure 2.   . The utility of ethical vs. unethical investment. (Beal & Phillips 2005.) 
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way, it dates back for hundreds of years as many directives how to invests ethically were 
discussed in the bible and the Talmud. For example, investments in alcohol distilleries, 
gambling or weapon manufacturers were prohibited according to the Jewish customs. 
Many of these negative “social screens” are still in place today. (Hawken 2004; Schueth 
2003.) 
Furthermore, as the Christian churches started to invest, they also emphasized the ethical 
investing as peace and non–violence is essential for the modern church. Furthermore, 
both religions have strong ethical grounds on helping the poor and distributing wealth in 
some way. These ideas can be seen as early forms of community investing. Thus, it can 
be stated that the bases of SRI is in the religious views and their practices. However, it 
was not until the end of 1960s when SRI became more known to the general public and 
a more general form of investing in a modern sense. (Hawken 2004; Schueth 2003.) 
At this time, there were new important factors that increased the demand for more ethical 
investment practices. The awakening of the concerns about the environmental problems 
came simultaneously with the concerns of military actions in Vietnam and civil rights 
issues in the US. Later on, socially responsible investing has played a crucial role in many 
other crises, for example, it was also essential in the South Africa as the general public 
withdrew their capital from the region in the fight against apartheid. Together these forces 
with the unfortunate catastrophes of Exxon Valdez oil spill and Bhobal chemical disaster, 
among others, made the public to demand stricter CSR actions, and along came SRI. 
(Hawken 2004; Schueth 2003.) 
In the 2000s SRI has gained more interest in every level. Furthermore, academics have 
been publishing a fast growing body of research regarding it. Also, the UN made its own 
principles of responsible investing, which was just one of the new ways for more 
structured and standardized methods of responsible investing. Nowadays there are several 
organizations advocating ESG values and socially responsible investing and the number 
of funds, indices and companies following ESG principles is ever growing. (Principles 
for Responsible Investment 2016.)   
2.2 Introduction to SRI strategies 
SRI can be divided in three subcategories: shareholder advocacy, community investing 
and screening, respectively. In shareholder advocacy, as the name implies, the purpose is 
to get a sufficient amount of investors behind an institute that is further influencing the 
corporate executives and speaking up in annual meeting to advocate shareholders’ agenda. 
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Also, some actively performing individuals or group of individuals without institutional 
connections can use their power over their agenda in case their shares create a sufficient 
portion to gain control over the company as an owner. (Hawken 2004; Schueth 2003.) 
Community investing refers to a practice where in certain low–income communities 
money is used to fight inequality and poverty. Investors, for example, engage in different 
kinds of projects economically to develop the community or give small–business loans 
for entrepreneurs with no access to traditional funding in order to create new businesses. 
(Schueth 2003.) 
Screening is the most common strategy used by investors. It is further divided in negative 
and positive screening. The former refers to practices where certain industries are not 
included in the portfolio due to unethical practices. Most commonly used negative 
screenings are alcohol, weapons and military industries, pornography, tobacco and 
gaming. These are often times referred as the sin industries. Also, different kinds of 
negative screenings can be applied in many other ways and situations, such as divesting 
in oil stocks. Negative screening may lead to situations where the restrained stocks are 
cheaper due to their lack of demand in the markets, in case many large institutional 
investors are restrained to invest in them. Consequently, the capital flow in these stocks 
is lower as well. (Hawken 2004; Hong & Kacperczyk 2009; Schueth 2003.) 
Positive screening, on the other hand, is a search for the best ESG firms. Positive 
screenings can vary greatly, but most common screens are the corporate governance 
practices, human rights and labor questions, environmental practices and sustainability. 
Nowadays there are several companies offering ratings according to these positive 
screenings, however, many also offer best–in–class qualifications for each industry 
regardless of its perceived sinfulness. (Hawken 2004; Schueth 2003.)
17 
 
  
 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The academic interest towards SRI can be traced back to Moskowitz (1972); after his 
paper a wave of studies regarding the topic emerged. In the 2000s, new concerns about 
the climate change brought SRI studies in the spotlight again. After the financial crisis, 
there have been more emphasis in social and governmental aspects as well. Nowadays, 
most studies cover all the aspects of ESG. However, despite a fairly large body of 
academic research, there are far less studies using single stocks or a portfolio of stocks, 
as most research focusses on the SRI funds. Furthermore, there are many studies 
worldwide, but few in Nordic countries, and most of these also focus on the SRI funds. 
In the literature review, the studies considered most influential or most relevant about the 
topic are introduced.  
3.1 Socially responsible investing 
Index investing has been very popular in the 2000s, so naturally there are studies taking 
advantage of the index data. For example, Huimin and Roca (2010) matches seven SRI 
indices with respected benchmarks, however, no significant difference in the risk–
adjusted performance can be found. Also, a study of Statman and Meir (2006) ends up in 
the same conclusions, as they compare four global SRI indices with the respected 
benchmarks. Moreover, a study of Schröder (2005) explores the differences of 29 SRI 
indices to their benchmarks and finds no significant difference in the risk–adjusted returns.  
Furthermore, there is little difference between the performance of SRI and conventional 
funds for most studies conducted with funds. For example, regarding the US markets 
studies of Bello (2005), Statman (2000) and Hamilton and Statman (1993), among others, 
seem to end up with this conclusion. Also, for the UK market, no significant difference 
is found between conventional and SRI funds in most studies6. Moreover, in research 
covering multiple countries there is usually no difference between the two. For example, 
Kreander et al. (2005) explore ethical funds from 40 different European countries and 
find no significant difference in the returns compared to the conventional funds. However, 
ethical funds tend to have lower standard deviations and systematic risk.  
Nevertheless, there are studies finding an underperformance for ethical funds in 
comparison to their conventional counterparts. Areal, Cortez and Silva (2009) find under–
performance for the US and Austrian SRI funds, while other European funds show no 
                                                 
6See for example. Gregory & Whittaker (2007); Gregory, Matatko & Luther (1997); Luther, Matatko & 
Corner. (1992) and Mallin, Saadouni & Briston. (1995). 
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signs of differences between the two as they study 39 European and seven US funds 
between 1996 and 2008. They also state that the SRI funds are heavily exposed to growth 
and small–cap stocks7. Similarly, a study of Swedish ethical funds by Rennebook (2008) 
shows conventional funds defeating the ethical ones between the years 1991 to 2003. 
However, as the time period is divided in smaller sections, in the later period the ethical 
funds seem to match the performance of the conventional ones. Furthermore, a study of 
Renneboog, Horst and Thang (2008) uses a world–wide data of 440 SRI funds from 17 
countries. The study finds an annual underperformance of 2.2. – 6.5 percent for the SRI 
funds with respect to conventional ones using the Capital asset pricing model. 
Also, Brammer, Brooks and Pavelin (2006) find evidence of underperformance of the 
responsible corporations in the UK using disaggregated measures for environmental, 
community and employment activities. The study states that especially good performance 
in employment, and to some extent the environmental aspects relates to a weaker financial 
performance. Furthermore, the portfolio of least responsible stocks yields sizable 
abnormal returns. In a similar manner for the French market, Leite and Cortez (2014) find 
the conventional funds a better investment during normal times in comparison to SRI 
funds selected with negative screening. However, during a market downturn, there is no 
significant difference in the performance. Also, funds using positive screening do not 
perform any differently to their conventional counterparts despite the market conditions.  
Moreover, Kim, Li and Li (2014) state that quality CSR activities reduce the stock price 
crash–risk during a crisis. The study of Mitton (2002) also finds evidence of good 
corporate governance activities shielding stock from a downside price drop during the 
East–Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998. Godfrey, Merrill and Hansen (2009) also 
confirm the shielding impact of good CSR practices against market uncertainty. Their 
study covering 160 different companies from 1991 to 2002 finds a negative market shocks 
to be less of a burden for the responsible companies than their less considerable 
counterparts.  
In additions, El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok and Mishra (2011) find a positive CSR effect in 
the account based study between the years 1992 to 2007 covering 12 915 US companies. 
The results indicate that companies with good socially responsible practices have higher 
valuation and lower risk since these firms have lower equity costs, while “sin” firms tend 
to have higher ones. Furthermore, Kempf and Osthoff (2007) produce abnormal returns 
of 8.7 percent per annum using a simple best–in–class –strategy, buying most socially 
                                                 
7Also studies of Bauer, Koedijik & Otten (2005); Geczy, Stambaugh & Levin (2003); Gregory et al. 
(1997); Schröder (2004), among others, notice the small-cap emphasis. 
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responsible stocks and selling stocks with low rating on responsibility. Also, Barnett and 
Salomon (2012) see the best CSP companies yielding the best financial results. However, 
they note that the relationship is nonlinear, but U–shaped, as the poorest CSP companies 
perform better than mediocre ones. 
20 
  
 
4. THEORETHICAL BACKROUND 
This chapter provides the general theory of market efficiency and introduces some of the 
most commonly used factor pricing models.  
4.1 Efficient Market Hypothesis 
The main role of capital markets is the allocation of resources and the ownership of 
economies capital in an effective manner. In an ideal situation the market provides 
accurate signals for this purpose. The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) states that all 
the relevant information is always reflected in the stock prices and therefore, it is not a 
possibility to beat the market unless excess risk is taken. This also means that there are 
no undervalued or overvalued stocks. (Fama 1970; Jensen 1968.) 
The EMH was the cornerstone and the prevailing theory of finance for decades and it was 
seen to explain how the information correlated with stock prices. According to the EMH 
the market is always right, as on average, the investors are rational. Even if some 
individuals are not, their decisions tend to cancel one another. The random walk 
hypothesis (RWH) is closely related to the investors’ inability to beat the market. The 
RWH states that the price changes are completely unpredictable and new information is 
fully and immediately reflected in the stock prices. Therefore, today’s news reflects the 
prices today, immediately upon the news release, and tomorrow’s news tomorrow despite 
the stock price today or further in the past. (Malkiel 2003.) 
Nonetheless, the reality is often more complex than the theory. One of the most common 
ways to shed light to the market efficiency in real life capital markets is to further divide 
market efficiency according to the information and different levels of efficiency. Fama 
(1970) uses three distinct categories, which each adding more rules to the previous one, 
while still including the weaker form of efficiency. The weak–form is at the bottom, 
followed by semi–strong and lastly strong–form of efficiency. The relationship can be 
seen from the figure 3.  
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Figure 3. The forms of market efficiency. (Compare to Fama 1970.) 
 
 
The three forms of market efficiency according to Fama (1970) are introduced below.  
4.1.1 Weak–form of efficiency 
According to the weak–form market efficiency investors cannot consistently beat the 
market using historical prices of securities as these are reflect in today’s price. 
Furthermore, the future prices do not follow any predictable patterns. Therefore, the 
securities are following the random walk and the prices are unpredictable. However, the 
weak–form efficiency does not expect the securities to be correctly priced, but expects 
the mispricing to be short–lived. Many anomalies are often seen opposing the market 
efficiency even in its weakest form. However, usually when an anomaly becomes a 
knowledge of the general public, it diminishes, thus leading to the market to “repair” itself. 
For example, the January effect, which leads to abnormal return in January in comparison 
to other months has mostly disappeared since it became well documented in the 1970s. 
(De Bondt & Thaler 1987; Fama 1970; Malkiel 2003.) 
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4.1.2 Semi–strong form of efficiency 
The semi–strong efficiency includes the weak–form and builds on it as not only historical 
prices, but also all the publicly available information must be available. Also, this 
information is immediately incorporated into the prices of the securities. However, 
usually it is seen that a minor delay is acceptable as long as investors cannot benefit from 
it. Event studies are used to examine the transmission of the publicly available 
information into the security prices. For example, initial public offerings and many 
regular reports, such as annual reports are used for this purpose. (Fama 1970; Malkamäki 
1990: 37.) 
4.1.3 Strong–form of efficiency 
The third and the strictest form of market efficiency is the strong–form, which in addition 
to the public information adds the private information in the equation. Security prices are 
seen to reflect all the available information there is, including inside information. This 
does not mean that few investor could not beat the market by pure luck, as there are 
always few investors doing better and few worse than the market on average. However, 
the strong–form efficiency is more theoretical as it has not been documented in any real 
markets. (Fama 1970; Malkamäki 1990: 39.) 
Nevertheless, Fama (1970) argues that despite real life constrains, capital markets can 
still be effective despite their fair share of frictions. Firstly, there would be no transaction 
costs in the efficient markets. This is likely to affect the number of transactions taken by 
market participants as high costs cut out some smaller trades, yet the security prices are 
still reflected correctly by all the available information. Secondly, if it is very costly for 
investors to obtain all the available information, it might lead to a situation where the 
prices do not fully reflect it. However, it can be argued that if a sufficient amount of well–
informed market participants have access to the relevant information, securities are priced 
correctly. Thirdly, it is unlikely that all the investor would interpret information in a 
similar manner, consequently there is no agreement on the correct stock price. However, 
whether the market participants agree or disagree on the stock price, there is no 
inefficiency as long as some investor cannot consistently make more accurate evaluations 
and thus abnormal returns. (Fama 1970; Fama, Fisher, Jensen & Roll 1969; Jensen 1968.) 
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4.2 Common asset pricing models 
In the modern finance theory the EMH still has its place, but the security prices are usually 
calculated with different asset pricing models. In this section, the CAPM is introduced as 
well as the Arbitrage pricing theory and the Fama–French three and five factor models.  
4.2.1 Capital asset pricing model 
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is probably the most known model there is. The 
model was first invented by Treynor in the 1960’s. It is overly simplistic and being proven 
to provide imperfect result. Yet, due to its simplicity, CAPM and its many variations are 
still used by professionals all over the world. In the model, systematic risk is seen to be 
the major component affecting the expected returns of a security as the unsystematic risk 
can be diversified away. Other factors are seen as irrelevant and are not taken into account. 
However, the CAPM requires some assumptions to be made. (Sharpe, Alexander & 
Bailey 1999: 227.) 
These assumptions are an identical holding horizon for all investors, commonly shared 
view of the economy and the way to analyze securities, that all investors are rational in a 
way that they choose the lowest volatility for the required rate of return, lack of taxes and 
transactions costs, existence of only publicly traded securities and lastly, actions of 
individual investors are not seen to effect the price of a security (Bodie, Kane & Marcus 
2002: 264). It is evident, that these assumptions do not exist in any real markets. However, 
usually it is seen that the model works well enough despite the failure to meet the 
assumptions. (Sharpe et al. 1999: 228.) 
The CAPM forms the equation for the risk–return relationship as follows: 
(1) E(ri,t)  =  rft  + βi(rMt  −  rft), 
where E(ri,t) is the expected return of a security i at time t, rft is the risk–free rate, βi is 
the beta of the security and lastly, rMt is the expected market return. (Sharpe et al. 1999: 
225.) 
4.2.2 Arbitrage pricing theory and factor models 
The Arbitrage pricing theory (APT), which is developed by Stephen Ross in 1976, is not 
as restrictive in its assumptions, even though it is based on the CAPM. Instead of focusing 
on portfolio efficiency, the theory takes a different approach. APT is based on three main 
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assumptions: firstly, the returns of the security can be described with a factor model, 
secondly, the amount of securities is sufficient in order to diversify the idiosyncratic risk 
and lastly, the arbitrage opportunities are only short–lived as the well–functioning capital 
market will take care of them. Therefore, investors can use APT to spot arbitrage 
opportunities in order to increase the return of their portfolio without increasing the risk. 
(Bodie, Kane & Marcus 2011: 323, 324.) 
In terms of risk, APT shares similar risk assumptions as the CAPM, as it faces the market 
risk and the firm–specific risk. Adequate diversification will remove the idiosyncratic risk 
but the market risk remains. A linear function is used to model the expected return of the 
security with the help of different factors. The factor specific beta coefficient measures 
the factor's sensitivity to change, as represented by Nikkinen, Rothovius and Sahlström. 
(2002: 78):  
(2) ri,t − rft = β1,irt,factor 1 − rf + β2,irt,factor 2 − rf + β3,irt,factor 3 +…, 
where β1,i marks the sensitivity of the first security to the first factor, β2,i the sensitivity 
of the second security to the second factor and etcetera. The strength of ATP is that unlike 
in the CAPM, the market portfolio does not have to be identified as each investor is seen 
to have a unique portfolio and its respective betas. However, as a disadvantage, 
underlying factors nor their quantity are known. (Brealey, Myers & Allen 2011: 229.) 
The most commonly used APT model is the Fama–French three factor model, developed 
in the year 1993 in response to the failure of the CAPM to fully explain the stock market 
returns. In their study, Fama and French (1993) note that macro–economic factors play 
an indirect role in explaining the multidimensional risks, and the stock returns are affected 
by multiple variables such as sales, debt and profits of the company.  
The Fama–French (1993) three factor model can be interpreted as follows: 
(3) ri,t − rft  =  𝛼i  + βi𝑀(rMt  −  rft)  +  βi𝑆 ∗  𝑆𝑀𝐵t  +  βi𝑉 ∗  𝐻𝑀𝐿t  +  Ɛi,t, 
where ri,t is the expected return of the security/portfolio at time t, the beginning of the 
equations is the CAPM, as rft serves as the risk–free rate, βi𝑀  as the beta of the 
security/portfolio and rMt return of the market portfolio. Furthermore, 𝑆𝑀𝐵t is the excess 
return of the Small Minus Big portfolio based on the market capitalization, 𝐻𝑀𝐿t is the 
excess returns of the High Minus Low portfolio based on the book–to–market value and 
the beta factors capture the size and value effect, marked as βi𝑆 and βi𝑉, respectively. If 
the factor exposures capture all the variation in the expected returns, the intercept 𝛼i is 
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zero, otherwise it marks the excess returns or returns not explained by the model. The Ɛi,t 
represents the error term.  
The added factors over the CAPM are there to capture its shortcomings. Small cap firms 
with considerably high book–to–market ratio exhibit higher returns than predicted by the 
CAPM. Therefore, with the additional factors, small firms can be more sensitive to the 
changes in the market environment and the book–to–market ratios can also be taken into 
account.  
Moreover, there are many other models which have been developed in recent years. The 
Fama–French (2015) five factor model is the latest asset pricing model building on the 
Fama–French three factor model to face the critique by Novo–Marx (2013) and others. 
The Fama–French five factor model adds two more factors to the equations: 
(4) ri,t − rft  =  𝛼i  + βi𝑀(rMt  −  rft)  +  βi𝑆 ∗  𝑆𝑀𝐵t  +  βi𝑉 ∗  𝐻𝑀𝐿t  +  βi𝑅 ∗
 𝑅𝑀𝑊t  + βi𝐶 ∗  𝐶𝑀𝐴t  +  Ɛi,t, 
where the equation (3) serves as the beginning, and the added factors are 𝑅𝑀𝑊t as the 
difference between the returns on diversified portfolios of securities with Robust Minus 
Weak profitability and 𝐶𝑀𝐴t  as the difference between the returns on diversified 
portfolios of stocks of companies investing a little and a lot (Conservative Minus 
Aggressive). Again, the 𝛽 factors are there to capture the variation of the expected 
returns with respect to a certain factor. In a similar manner, in case the factor 
exposures capture all the variation in the expected returns, the intercept 𝛼i is zero and the 
Ɛi,t marks the error term. (Fama & French 2015.)
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5. DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY  
5.1 Data and descriptive statistics    
The data consist of the NASDAQ Nordic stock market large cap stock returns series. 
There are no ESG stocks that passed the criteria in Iceland and Norway. Therefore, these 
countries are excluded from the study. This leaves us with the Finnish, Danish and 
Swedish stock markets. Only large cap stock are used because the Nordic markets are 
somewhat small and the mid–cap stocks may turn out to be quite modest in size in 
comparison to many other stock markets. Also, large cap stocks are more robust to 
analyze overtime, as they are less likely to exhibit radical changes in their ESG or other 
polices from one year to another. (NASDAQ a 2016.) 
The descriptive statistics for the respected stock exchanges can be seen in the first table. 
The Swedish stock market is the most influential of the three as it dominates the number 
of stock listed in the exchange. Consequently, it is also more pronounced in the Nordic 
large Cap and the portfolios examined in this study. Furthermore, the total market Cap 
for Sweden is larger than the combined Danish and Finnish market Caps, being roughly 
55 percent of the total market of the three countries. The Danish stock market is slightly 
large in size compared to the Finnish one with respect to number of stocks listed and the 
total market Cap.  
 
 
Nordic stock exchange data 
  Danish Finnish Swedish SUM 
Total market cap (billions) 2373 DKK 209 € 6141 SEK   
In USD (billions) 342 USD 224 USD 692 USD 1258 USD 
# of stocks in the exchange 141 125 310 576 
# of stocks in the large cap 41 34 119 194 
# of stocks in:      
ESG portfolio 7 6 15 28 
% of the large cap firms 0,17 0,18 0,13 0,14 
Non-ESG portfolio 8 5 15 28 
% of the large cap firms 0,20 0,15 0,13 0,14 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the Danish, Finnish and Swedish stock markets. The total market Cap 
and other figures as of December 2016. (Based on: Statistic from NASDAQ 2017.) 
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The monthly returns of the respected stock markets are obtained from the Thomson 
Reuters database. All values are in the USD in order to make the comparison between the 
different currencies easier. The time span is nearly 12 years, dating from 31.12.2004 to 
31.10.2016. Thus, for each stock included in the study there are a total of 143 monthly 
observations. However, some of the stocks are included later on. If a stock does not have 
at least one year of history, it is excluded from the study. The rather short time span is 
due to the rapidly changing conditions of SRI. The amount invested was quite modest 
before the 2000’s, however, the sector started to evolve drastically when the United 
Nations Environment Programme report stated in 2005 that it is fiduciary to include ESG 
issues into investment analysis (UNEP 2017). Also, the starting point at 2004 December 
allows the examination of the financial crisis with sufficient amount of data before and 
after the crisis.  
 For the robustness, a Nordic index of Danish, Finnish and Swedish large cap stocks is 
created. Data for this index is obtained from the individual large cap country indices from 
the MSCI database. The simple average of the monthly index returns of each respected 
country is added together and divided by three to get the compounded monthly returns 
for the large cap stocks. In this ways, a more general Nordic index is created to better 
capture the movement of the large cap stocks in the examined countries. Also the Nordic 
index uses monthly data in the USD for the respect time period. (MSCI 2017.)  
The descriptive statistics for the two portfolios examined and the used benchmark indices 
can be seen from the table 2. and their monthly returns series are in the figure 4.. The 
return series follow a similar path for both ESG and non–ESG portfolios, from the 
benchmarks the Nordic index seems to be slightly more similar to the portfolios examined. 
Similar observations can be seen from the descriptive statistics. It seems that the mean 
and median values are more positive for the non–ESG than the ESG portfolio, but both 
seem to beat the indices. However, also the skewness and standard deviations are much 
higher. The indices exhibit negative skewness while the examined portfolios positive. 
The Jarque–Bera values are high for all series, leading to rejection of the normal 
distributions.   
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the portfolios. The ESG and the Non–ESG (NESG) portfolios and the 
two benchmark indices: the combined Danish, Finnish and Swedish large cap stocks (NORDIC) and the 
overall European market (Mkt), respectively. All indices are net of the risk–free rate (rf). 
 
Descriptive statistics for the portfolios and indices used 
  ESG_RF NESG_RF MKT_RF NORDIC_RF 
 Mean 0,858 1,213 0,420 0,274 
 Median 0,659 1,280 0,680 0,475 
 Maximum 31,181 33,468 13,860 20,408 
 Minimum –24,760 –22,626 –22,170 –23,123 
 Std, Dev, 7,081 7,214 5,576 6,268 
 Skewness 0,140 0,274 –0,608 –0,408 
 Kurtosis 6,045 5,980 4,577 5,157 
       
 Jarque–Bera 55,317 54,336 23,462 31,473 
 Probability 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
       
 Sum 121,879 172,301 59,710 38,934 
 Sum Sq, Dev, 7070,229 7338,011 4383,979 5539,092 
       
 Observations 142 142 142 142 
29 
  
 
 
5.2 Portfolio construction 
There are many ways to evaluate the environmental, social and governmental practices 
of a company. In this study, two well established ratings providers are used. The 
RobecoSAM has been providing the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) series since 
1999. Every year they assess roughly 3,400 companies around the world to pick best–in–
class companies, as well as construct several indices based on their evaluation. Another 
well know information provider is the STOXX®. Their Global ESG leaders index 
provided by Sustainalytics is picking the leading companies in Europe in the field of ESG. 
(RobecoSAM 2016; STOXX 2016; Sustainalytics 2016; S&P Dow Jones Indices 2016.)  
In this study, the ESG Nordic portfolio is made manually, as is the matched sample 
portfolio with non–ESG stocks, applying the general matching principles 8 . The 
                                                 
8See for example. Altman 1968; Capelle–Blancard & Monjon 2014; Ritter 1991. 
Figure 4. Return series. The monthly returns of the ESG and the non-ESG portfolios and the two 
benchmark indices: the combined Danish, Finnish and Swedish large cap stocks (NORDIC) and the 
overall European market (Market), respectively. All indices are net of the risk-free rate (rf).  
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construction of the ESG portfolio is twofold. First, stocks are sorted into portfolios 
according to their status in the DJSI Invited Universe 2016. If the stock is included in the 
DJSI World or Europe index or both, it is seen as an ESG stock. Secondly, a double 
screening is used to get a more robust sample of the ESG stocks. For this purpose, the 
STOXX® Global ESG Leaders index is used. All the companies listed in the index from 
the Nordic countries are compared to those of the DJSI sample, and only the ones included 
in both are accepted in the Nordic ESG portfolio used in this study. In this way, a robust 
sample of firms with excellent ESG practices is created. Some of the stocks have different 
share classes based on voting rights. If a stock has multiple series, the one with the highest 
trading volatility is used. (RobecosSAM 2016; STOXX 2016; Sustainalytics 2016; S&P 
Dow Jones Indices 2016.) 
The non–ESG portfolio is constructed from the large cap Finnish, Swedish and Danish 
stock as well. All the stocks included in either the DJSI or STOXX® ESG sample are 
excluded. In order to get a robust match for each ESG stock, it is matched manually with 
a non–ESG stock with the same ICB code, preferably within the same subsector. If this 
is not possible, then within the same sector or ultimately within the same supersector9, 
which are the first subcategories under the main sectors.  
Also, if possible, the stock style analysis is used to better match the stocks; e.g. pairing 
growth stock with growth stocks and value stock with value stocks. However, as the 
Nordic market is quite small, some industries provide few or no ESG stocks or lack the 
potential counterpart for one. Therefore, all the ESG stocks cannot be matched, for 
example the Oil and Gas industry, as well as the Consumer Services are not included in 
the study due to these problems. The list of the matched stocks can be found from the 
appendix. (NASDAQ a 2016; NASDAQ b 2016.) 
Ones the stocks are divided into the two portfolios, the monthly change of the average 
returns of each portfolio is calculated. As the time span of the study is rather long, there 
are some stock that are included in the study later on. In the beginning there are 22 pairs 
of stocks and in the end 28, respectively. The ESG stock and its counterpart are naturally 
added in the same month, so that each portfolio have the same amount of stocks at all 
times.  
                                                 
9List of the used supersectors can be found from the appendix. The NASDAQ main categories are Oil and 
Gas, Materials, Industrials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Health Care, Telecom, Utilities, 
Financial and Technology.  
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5.3 Methodology  
In this study, Eviews is used for the regression analysis and Excel for editing the data. 
Least Squares corrected with HAC Newey–West covariance method are used in the 
regressions. The CAPM and the Fama–French (FF) five factor model is used to examine 
the two portfolios and their differences. The data for the ESG and the non–ESG portfolios 
is constructed manually as stated above and the data for the monthly European factors is 
taken from Kenneth French’ website10. The monthly returns over the risk–free rate for 
each portfolio is run individually against the CAPM and the five factor model to see how 
well the factors capture profits generated by the portfolio, as well as any excess returns 
not explained by the factors, noted as an alpha. Moreover, the difference between the 
profits of the ESG and the non–ESG portfolio is examined in a similar manner.  
The sample runs from December 2004 to October 2016 and it is further divided in three 
sub–periods. Financial downturn has been seen to affect differently the ESG and 
conventional stocks11. Therefore, the financial crisis is a natural way to divide the sample 
according to the turbulence in the market into the pre–crisis, crisis and post–crisis periods. 
This also allows the isolation of the impact of the crisis, as well as the examination of the 
differences between the respected portfolios during the different sub–periods.  
 
 
Correlations coefficients between the independent variables 
  MKT_RF SMB HML CMA RMW 
MKT_RF 1      
SMB –0.023 1     
HML 0.536 –0.013 1    
CMA –0.291 –0.253 –0.225 1   
RMW –0.390 –0.114 –0.776 –0.165 1 
Table 3. The Correlation coefficients between the independent variables.  
 
The table 3. presents the correlations coefficients between the FF five factor model 
independent variables. For the most part, there are no significant correlations between the 
                                                 
10http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
11See for example: Grigoris (2011), Kim et al. (2014), Leite & Cortez (2009), Mitton (2002), Souto 
(2009). 
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variables, but the RMW and the HML factors seem to be somewhat negatively correlated. 
However, this is not all that worrisome as dropping one or few of the factors seems to 
have only small impact on the main results. The regressions with only some of the factors 
are not included in the study as they provided little useful information. 
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6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The empirical results are presented in this chapter. Firstly, the CAPM is used to get the 
general idea of the results. Secondly, the main results of the study are introduced as the 
Fama–French (FF) five factor model regressions are run against the European factors, 
followed by the split sample results taking into account the financial crisis. Lastly, several 
robustness checks are performed, for example regressing the portfolios against the 
composed Nordic (Danish, Finnish and Swedish) large cap stock market index.  
6.1 CAPM regression results 
Table 4. introduces the general CAPM result for the whole sample. The whole time period 
yields no significant alpha for the ESG portfolio, and a monthly alpha of 0.0073 percent 
(0.731 BPS) for the non–ESG portfolio at 1 percent significance level using the CAPM. 
The market factor is significant and similar for each portfolio, being slightly larger than 
one. The goodness–of–fit is rather good based on the r–squared, ranging from 0.786 to 
0.845.  
To get a more robust idea of the result, the CAPM regression is split for three time periods. 
The financial crisis affected the stocks markets all over the world, and the Nordic stock 
market was no exception. Thus, the financial crisis is used to split the sample in three. 
Throughout this study, the starting point for the financial crisis is marked as July 2007 
and the end of the crisis as April 2009 with the strong uplift in the stock market. Table 5. 
introduces the split sample results. 
 
 
CAPM Regression results 
  ESG Non-ESG 
a 
 
0.367  
(1.59) 
0.731*** 
(2.89) 
Mkt 
 
1.168*** 
(23.60) 
1.147*** 
(20.10) 
R2 0.845 0.786 
Table 4. The CAPM results with the FF European market benchmark. The sample runs from December 
2004 to November 2016. ESG is the environmentally, governmentally and socially responsible Nordic 
stock portfolio and non–ESG its conventional counterpart. The stars indicate statistical significance: *** at 
1%, ** at 5%, *** at 10% level. The results are in basis points (BPS). The t-Statistics are in the parentheses.  
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CAPM split sample regression result  
  Pre–crisis Crisis Post–crisis 
  ESG Non–ESG ESG Non–ESG ESG Non–ESG 
a 
 
0.071 
(0.17) 
0.556 
(1.49) 
-0.517 
(-0.51) 
-1.723* 
(-1.82) 
0.510* 
(1.88) 
0.968*** 
(3.07) 
MKT 
 
1.342*** 
(11.28) 
1.434*** 
(10.72) 
1.084*** 
(14.09) 
0.898*** 
(7.22) 
1.170*** 
(16.03) 
1.176*** 
(13.45) 
R2 0.783 0.738 0.864 0.760 0.829 0.792 
Table 5. The CAPM split sample results with the FF European market benchmark. The stars indicate 
statistical significance: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, *** at 10% level. The results are in basis points. The t-Statistics 
are in the parentheses. 
 
It can be seen that the European market beta is highly significant at all times for both 
portfolios. It shows how sensitive the portfolios’ excess returns are with respect to the 
excess returns of the market. The market beta is rather high in the pre–crisis period, closer 
to one in the crisis period and slightly higher again after the crisis. The non–ESG portfolio 
seems to have a bit more volatile relationship with the market beta, but the pattern is fairly 
similar for both portfolios.  
Both portfolios have a positive pre–crisis alpha, yet it is not statistically significant for 
either. However, during the crisis the alpha turns negative for both, the non–ESG portfolio 
yielding –0.01723 percent (–1.723 BPS) per month at 10 percent significance level. After 
the crisis both portfolios show a positive alpha, while result for the ESG portfolio are 
weaker in both economic and statistical sense, the non–ESG portfolio yields a highly 
significant alpha of 0.00968 percent (0.968 BPS)  per month. The R2 values, measuring 
the goodness–of–fit of the model, are decent ranging from 0.738 to 0.864.  
6.2 The Fama–French five factor model main results 
The FF five factor model is used to regress the ESG and the non–ESG portfolio returns 
against the European factors. Table 6. presents the main results for the whole time period 
examined. The ESG portfolio does seem to yield a positive alpha, but it lacks the 
significance. However, the non–ESG portfolio yields a significant alpha of 0.0062 percent 
(0.620 BPS) on monthly basis (7.712  percent annually). There does not seems to be 
                                                 
12Calculated as (1+0.0062)^12-1=0.0769. The same method is used for the other annualized returns. 
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significance on the difference of the two, even though the magnitude is correct. The model 
explains rather well the portfolios examined at least according to the R–squared, 
indicating approximately 85 percent goodness–of–fit for both.  
 
 
FF regression result from 2004M12 to 2016M10 
  a MKT SMB HML RMW CMA R2 
ESG 
 
0.386 
(1.64) 
1.10*** 
(15.98) 
0.142 
(1.03) 
0.162 
(0.45) 
0.097 
(0.33) 
-0.530 
(-1.51) 
0.857 
 
Non–ESG 
 
0.620*** 
(3.23) 
1.105*** 
(12.37) 
0.797*** 
(6.54) 
0.107 
(0.09) 
0.023 
(0.32) 
-0.374 
(-1.14) 
0.841 
 
Difference 
 
-0.235 
(-1.27) 
-0.002 
(-0.03) 
-0.655** 
(-6.49) 
0.055 
(0.38) 
0.074 
(0.35) 
-0.160 
(-0.95) 
0.213 
 
Table 6. The general FF five factor result for the whole time period. The stars indicate statistical 
significance: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, *** at 10% level. The results are in basis points. The t-Statistics are in 
the parentheses. 
 
Overall, it seems that with the exception of the overall market returns, few of the FF five 
factor model components are significance even at 10 percent level. According to the 
market factor, both portfolios are slightly more aggressive than the market as a whole. 
Furthermore, the SMB factor loadings are positive for both, and especially the non–ESG 
factor exhibits statistical significance and the portfolio seems to behave much like a small 
cap portfolio. This is interesting, since only large cap stocks are used. However, the FF 
factors are European, and thus the Nordic large cap companies may just be smaller in size 
in comparison to the European market as a whole.  
6.3 The Fama–French five factor model split sample results 
Table 7. presents the split sample regression results. Now, the FF five factor model is 
used to examine the two portfolios for different time–periods. There is a positive alpha 
for the ESG portfolio before and after the crisis, nevertheless, the excess returns turn 
negative during the crisis. However, these results lack any statistical significance. 
Furthermore, only the market factor seems to be consistently significant at all time periods 
for the ESG portfolio. The portfolio is more aggressive before and after the crisis, whilst 
during the crisis the portfolio gets marginally defensive. With few exceptions, the other 
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FF factors do not prohibit any significance.  
 
 
FF five factor regression result with split sample   
    a MKT SMB HML RMW CMA R2 
ESG 
Before Crisis 
 
0.622 
(1.03) 
1.304*** 
(7.54) 
-0.024 
(-0.07) 
-0.619 
(-1.27) 
-0.959* 
(-1.15) 
-0.658 
(1.03) 
0.825 
 
  
During Crisis 
 
-0.141 
(-0.17) 
0.961*** 
(9.05) 
0.322 
(1.12) 
0.845 
(1.67) 
0.795 
(0.87) 
-0.428 
(-1.41) 
0.878 
 
  
After Crisis 
 
0.402 
(1.38) 
1.136*** 
(13.48) 
0.183 
(1.04) 
0.245 
(0.57) 
0.249 
(0.72) 
-0.702** 
(-1.40) 
0.846 
 
Non–ESG 
Before Crisis 
 
1.20*** 
(2.49) 
1.436*** 
(8.72) 
0.240 
(0.65) 
-0.112** 
(-2.14) 
-0.778** 
(-2.39) 
-0.620 
(-1.42) 
0.778 
 
  
During Crisis 
 
-0.897 
(-1.10) 
0.700*** 
(5.10) 
0.549* 
(1.77) 
0.205 
(0.48) 
-0.163 
(-0.16) 
-0.989** 
(-3.09) 
0.860 
 
  
After Crisis 
 
0.621*** 
(2.27) 
1.180*** 
(15.40) 
0.907*** 
(6.46) 
0.226 
(0.52) 
0.247 
(0.77) 
-0.515 
(-1.00) 
0.851 
 
Difference 
Before Crisis 
 
-0.582 
(-1.23) 
-0.119 
(-0.91) 
-0.256 
(-1.90) 
-0.497 
(1.25) 
-0.180 
(-0.52) 
-0.0288 
(-0.06) 
0.087 
 
  
During Crisis 
 
0.748 
(0.74) 
0.259 
(1.64) 
-0.232 
(-0.84) 
0.631 
(0.71) 
0.946 
(0.54) 
0.560 
(1.06) 
0.297 
 
  
After Crisis 
 
-0.219 
(-1.02) 
-0.044 
(-1.19) 
-0.724*** 
(-5.82) 
0.018 
(0.15) 
0.002 
(0.01) 
-0.187 
(-1.10) 
0.299 
 
Table 7. The FF five factor split sample results. The stars indicate statistical significance: *** at 1%, ** 
at 5%, *** at 10% level. The results are in basis points. The t-Statistics are in the parentheses. 
 
The non–ESG portfolio, on the other hand, exhibits significant abnormal returns before 
and after the crisis. However, the crisis periods is time of negative excess returns, yet 
without any significance. Before the crisis, the abnormal returns are as high as 0.012 
percent (1.20 BPS) monthly (15.4 percent annually13), while there is a large drop in the 
alpha after the crisis to a more moderate 0.00621 percent (0.621 BPS, 7.7 percent 
annually). The market factor loadings are also highly significant at all time periods, 
exhibiting similar pattern as the ESG portfolio: defensive during the crisis, otherwise 
aggressive. Other factors do not show all that consistent nor significant patterns across 
different periods examined. However, the SMB factor indicates that the non–ESG 
portfolio might be more exposed to small cap stocks, at least after the crisis.  
The goodness–of–fit measured by R–squared remains high for the ESG and non–ESG 
portfolios for the split sample, ranging from 78 to 88 percent. However, the difference 
                                                 
13Calculated as (1+0.012)^12-1=0.1538.  
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portfolio exhibits low R–squared values. Furthermore, despite the highly significant 
difference in the SMB factor after the crisis, there are no signs of significance for other 
factor loadings for the difference portfolio.  
6.4 Robustness checks 
6.4.1 Regressions against the Nordic large cap 
The European market might be too broad an area when choosing the benchmark index 
for the Nordic portfolios examined in the study. Therefore, as a robustness check, a 
Nordic large cap index is made from the Danish, Finnish and Swedish large cap stocks, 
and the ESG and non–ESG portfolios are examined against it with the CAPM. The Nordic 
index is constructed as stated in the data section.  
 
 
CAPM Regression result against the Nordic large Cap 
  Pre–crisis Crisis Post–crisis 
  ESG Non–ESG ESG Non–ESG ESG 
Non–
ESG 
a 
 
0.653 
(1.47) 
1.21** 
(2.64) 
-0.600 
(-0.62) 
-1.843 
(-1.52) 
0.700** 
(2.44) 
1.155*** 
(3.45) 
Nordic 
 
1.035*** 
(14.16) 
1.080*** 
(10.97) 
0.951*** 
(12.39) 
0.775*** 
(8.05) 
1.074*** 
(14.44) 
1.086*** 
(12.59) 
R2 0.794 0.712 0.870 0.740 0.857 0.828 
Table 8. The CAPM regression result against the Nordic large cap. The stars indicate statistical 
significance: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, *** at 10% level. The results are in basis points. The t-Statistics are in 
the parentheses. 
 
The table 8. shows that changing the benchmark index does have an effect on the results. 
While the R2 level do not differ significantly between the Nordic and European 
benchmarks, there are differences in the market beta values, as the Nordic benchmark is 
less volatile for both portfolios, and close to one for all periods examined here, with the 
exception of crisis period for the Non–ESG portfolios.  
Furthermore, the Non–ESG portfolio alphas are large and significant before and after the 
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crisis, while ESG portfolio shows significance only after the crisis with a positive alpha. 
Both portfolios have a negative alpha during the crises, again more so for the non–ESG 
portfolio. Yet, they lack the statistical significance. The main differences between the 
benchmarks is that with the Nordic benchmark, the pre–crisis alpha is significant for the 
non–ESG portfolio, while the alphas lose any significance for the crisis period and the 
ESG portfolio shows a more robust alpha after the crisis. To sum up, while there are 
differences between the benchmark indices, the main result of the FF five factor model 
can be mostly confirmed using either.  
6.4.2 Diagnostic tests 
Serial correlation violates the standard assumptions of the regression theory. At worst, 
this may cause the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimations to be biased and 
inconsistent as the standard errors and T–statistic may be invalid. Therefore, the Breusch–
Godfrey Serial Correlation LM –test is performed in order to spot serial correlation in the 
model. The results do not seem to be all that worrisome, but for a precautionary measures, 
serial correlation is corrected in the regressions. The full results of the test can be found 
from the appendix. 
Another common problem with regression models is heteroscedasticity. The White test 
is performed to spot the heteroscedasticity in the regression model. In fact, 
heteroscedasticity is found for both portfolios as the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity 
is rejected. This means that the error terms should be adjusted. The White test result can 
be find from the appendix.  
All the regression performed in the previous chapter are improved in Eviews using the 
HAC standard errors and covariance correction option (Bartlett kernel, Newey–West 
fixed), which should take care of any heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problems. 
This is a standard procedure in regression analysis and should not affect the results all 
that much. The OLS regression without the corrections can be found from the appendix, 
but there are not that significant differences to the corrected ones. In short, with the 
corrections, some of the already vague Fama–French factors lose their significance while 
the non–ESG portfolio returns are still superior in comparison to the ESG portfolio.  
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7. CONCLUSIONS   
7.1 Conclusions of the study 
This study examines the SRI investing in the Nordic countries. Overall, the study 
contributes to the existing literature in a few important ways. Firstly, while SRI has been 
widely studied in the world, the Nordic countries have had less attention, especially in 
terms of profitability. Secondly, the previous studies are mostly concentrated on the 
difference between SRI and conventional funds or the effects of CSR practices for the 
firm profitability. This study, however, creates an ESG portfolio based on the most 
advanced companies in Denmark, Finland and Sweden, allowing the comparison of a 
Nordic ESG stock portfolio to its matched conventional counterpart. Thus, the relevant 
information about the profitability of ESG stocks in the Nordic markets is discovered. 
The following hypotheses were examined.  
Hypotheses 1: ESG stocks act as a buffer during financial crisis, mitigating possible 
losses. 
Overall, it seems that the research supports the first hypothesis; ESG stocks might act as 
a buffer in comparison to conventional stocks during a crisis periods. It can be seen from 
the regression performed in this study that the non–ESG portfolio has additional negative 
returns compared to the ESG portfolio during the crisis. However, only the CAPM with 
European market factor can find some statistical significance to back up the buffer effect. 
Also, this difference is insignificant when the Nordic market benchmark is used. 
Moreover, the FF five factor model does not seem to capture any significant differences 
between the two portfolios during the crisis. Therefore, the hypothesis one is rejected due 
to the lack of statistical significance.  
Hypotheses 2: The non–ESG portfolio is more profitable than the ESG portfolio. 
Hypothesis two, however, is supported by the regressions done in the study. The CAPM 
results indicate strong and statistically significant alpha for the non–ESG portfolio after 
the crisis and for the time period as a whole. However, during and before the crisis the 
results are more mixed. The ESG portfolio is also associated with statistically significant 
alpha after the crisis, especially with the Nordic benchmark. However, the FF five factor 
regressions do not show support for any statistical significance for the ESG portfolio 
alpha.  
Moreover, the crisis period is mostly lacking statistical significance for either portfolio. 
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However, especially the FF five factor regressions show strong evidence of statistically 
and economically significant alpha for the non–ESG portfolio before and after the crisis. 
Furthermore, the non–ESG portfolio yields an annual alpha of 7.7 percent for the time 
period as a whole. Thus, taken together all the evidence provided by the regressions, it 
can be stated that the non–ESG portfolio outperforms the ESG portfolio and yields a 
positive alpha, at least for the non–crisis periods. Therefore, the hypothesis two is 
confirmed for the time period as whole and for the non–crisis periods.  
7.2 Discussion regarding the conclusions 
Regarding the second hypothesis, it seems that the substantial alpha for the conventional 
portfolio is in line with studies of Rennebookg et al. (2008) and Brammer et al. (2006), 
among others. Also, the small cap emphasis of the non–ESG portfolio is very interesting, 
as some previous studies7 indicate that the ESG portfolio might be exposed to it, but not 
the conventional one. This indicates that the Nordic stock market might be different in 
comparison to other markets in some way. Also, it would be interesting to know why the 
large cap stocks behave in this manner. One possible explanation is that the European 
benchmark index is constructed form overall larger stocks than the Nordic large cap 
stocks. However, no such emphasis can be seen for the ESG portfolio. Thus, it can be that 
the two portfolios differ in some other way than ESG wise, although the stocks have been 
paired with the closest match.  
Regardless of differences between the portfolios, the results can be interpreted in a way 
that one should not use positive screenings, not even best–in–class –approach in the 
Nordic stock market, at least for the sake of excess returns. This of course does not mean 
that investors could not benefit in other ways as they participate in the ESG investing. 
Even though the first hypothesis is rejected, the result indicate that the ESG portfolio 
might perform better during the crisis in comparison to the non–ESG portfolio. In 
accordance, a similar pattern about the buffer effect can be found as in many previous 
studies3.  
Regarding the first hypothesis, the possible buffer effect is easily understood. It is 
reasonably evident that in an economic down turn, companies with good reputation and 
solid ESG practices are less likely to face any funding constrains, since investors may be 
in it for the good cause and not only for the financial profits. Also, sound CSR practices 
are likely to erode any unethical or even criminal behavior, which might lead to 
substantial losses when this behavior is exposed. Although this study fails to confirm the 
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buffer effect it does not mean it could not exist. 
To sum up, the non–ESG portfolio is more profitable compared to the ESG portfolio. 
However, whether the results are due to the restricted investment options for the SRI 
investors, or the fact that SRI investors might get investments gains not measured in the 
profits, but in the overall satisfaction as participating in a good cause or any other reasons, 
is out of the scope of this study.  
7.3 Possible caveats of the study and ideas for further research 
As it can be seen from the main result, the non–ESG portfolio provides a statistically and 
economically significant alpha. However, the alpha seems to get large and negative 
during the financial crisis. The lack of statistical significance is an issue, but this negative 
alpha partly offsets the positive alpha created in the non–crisis periods. The use of 
monthly data might not be suitable for such a short period examined as the financial crisis, 
and therefore, it might be beneficial to redo the study with weekly data to confirm the 
negative alpha and the possible buffer effect of the ESG portfolio over the non–ESG 
portfolio during the crisis. However, weekly data is out of the scope of this study. 
Moreover, both portfolios are constructed by hand and might contain some errors due to 
data handling or other issues. Therefore, the results should be interpreted with precautions. 
Furthermore, the construction of the ESG portfolio is done using the RobecoSAM DJSI 
index and the STOXX® Global ESG leaders index data as of November 2016. Therefore, 
any additions or deletions from the indices before or after this month are not taken into 
consideration. However, this might not be such a big problem, because to be added in the 
indices in the first place, a sound history of good ESG practices is needed. Furthermore, 
as only large cap companies are included, any radical shifts in the ESG policies are less 
likely to occur during the period examined here. Yet, the data might be more reliable after 
the financial crisis, as the number of stocks included in the study is larger and the ESG 
policies are more likely to reflect their current state in the company. 
Moreover, both indices used to construct the ESG portfolio use their own best–in–class –
approach, yet not limiting the companies to just one, but few companies best in a certain 
sector. This means that with different screening techniques, for example negative 
screening, the result would have been different. Also, the selection of stocks used might 
not be a fully representable sample of the Nordic ESG stock market. For example, the 
Swedish stocks are dominant in the sample. Also, the industries are not evenly distributed 
as industrial goods and services make up a notable portion of the sample. However, these 
42 
  
 
notions are also somewhat in line with the general picture of the Nordic stock markets; 
the Swedish stock market is the dominate one in size and volume, and Sweden is one of 
the leading countries regarding SRI. In addition, the industrial goods and services is a 
dominate industry in the Nordic countries, thus, representing the true investment 
opportunities.  
The construction of the matched sample non–ESG portfolio is also a possible concern. 
For some companies, the matched counterpart might not share the same risks and market 
reactions to events or news. Therefore, the matched stocks might act differently because 
of other differences between the stocks than the mere ESG practices. Also, the Nordic 
market is rather small, so not all qualified ESG stocks can be used in the study due to the 
lack of solid counterparts. However, the use of general matching principles is likely to 
limit the problems created by the portfolio construction.  
All in all, the popularity of SRI is rising as the ESG aspects are becoming more and more 
important for investors. There are already a rather large body of research done from the 
topic, but the result are still mixed. Naturally, this study is not concluding the matter 
permanently in one way or another. Also, the field is still evolving because of the rapidly 
changing market conditions and growing number of new players. Moreover, there is still 
no unity about the basic concepts; what is viewed as responsible investing might differ 
from one study to another. Therefore, more robust and universal way to define ESG stocks 
might be beneficial for any future research. Also, it might be interesting to study why 
investors choose ESG stocks and whether they view their profits in a similar manner 
compared to their conventional counterparts. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
43 
  
 
REFERENCES 
Altman, E. I. (1968). Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of 
corporate bankruptcy. The journal of finance 23:4, 589–609. 
Barnett, M., & Salomon, R. (2012). Does it pay to be really good? Addressing the shape 
of the relationship between social and financial performance. Strategic Management 
Journal 33:11, 1304–1320. 
Bauer, R., Koedijk K., Otten., R., (2005). International evidence on ethical mutual fund 
performance and investment style. Journal of Banking and Finance 29, 1751–1767. 
Beal, Diana, Michelle Goyen & Peter Phillips (2005). Why Do We Invest Ethically? The 
Journal of Investing 14:3, 66–78. 
Bello, Zakri (2005). Socially responsible investing and portfolio diversification. The 
Journal of Financial Research 28:1, 41–57. 
Bengtsson, E. (2008 a). A history of Scandinavian socially responsible investing. Journal 
of Business Ethics 82:4 969–983. 
Bengtsson, E. (2008 b). Socially responsible investing in Scandinavia–a comparative 
analysis. Sustainable Development 16:3, 155–168. 
Bodie, Z., Kane, A. & Marcus, A. (2011). Investments and Portfolio management. 9th ed. 
New York: McGraw–Hill Companies Inc. 1052 p. ISBN–10: 0071289143 
Bodie, Z. A. Kane & A. Marcus (2002). Investments. 5. ed. New York: McGraw–Hill 
Companies Inc. 1017 p. ISBN 007–2–50366–1.  
Brealey, Richard, Stewart Myers & Franklin Allen (2011). Principles of Corporate 
Finance. 10th ed. McGraw–Hill Inc. New York, USA. 875 p. ISBN 978–0–
07353073–4. 
Brammer, S., Brooks, C., & Pavelin, S. (2006). Corporate social performance and stock 
returns: UK evidence from disaggregate measures. Financial management 35:3, 97–
116. 
Capelle‐Blancard, G., & Monjon, S. (2014). The performance of socially responsible 
funds: does the screening process matter?. European Financial Management 20:3, 
494–520. 
Cortez, M., Silva, F., Areal, N., (2009). The performance of European socially 
44 
  
 
responsible funds. Journal of Business Ethics 87:4, 573‐588. 
De Bondt, W. F., & Thaler, R. H. (1987). Further evidence on investor overreaction and 
stock market seasonality. Journal of finance 557–581. 
Ducassy, I. (2013). Does corporate social responsibility pay off in times of crisis? An 
alternate perspective on the relationship between financial and corporate social 
performance. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, 
20:3, 157–167. 
El Ghoul, S., Guedhami, O., Kwok, C.C.Y., Mishra, D.R. (2011). Does Corporate Social 
Responsibility Affect the Cost of Capital? Journal of Banking and Finance 35:9, 
2388–2406 
Fama, E. (1970). Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work. 
The Journal of Finance 25:2, 383–417.  
Fama, E. & French (1993). Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds. 
Journal of Financial Economics 33:1, 3–56. 
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (2015). A five–factor asset pricing model. Journal of 
Financial Economics 116:1, 1–22. 
Fama, E. F., Fisher, L., Jensen, M. C., & Roll, R. (1969). The adjustment of stock prices 
to new information. International economic review 10:1, 1–21. 
Geczy, C.C., Stambaugh, R.F., Levin, D., (2003). Investing in socially responsible mutual 
funds. Unpublished working paper, University of Pennsylvania. 
Giannarakis, G., & Theotokas, I. (2011). The effect of financial crisis in corporate social 
responsibility performance. International Journal of Marketing Studies 3:1, 2–10. 
Godfrey, P. C., Merrill, C. B., & Hansen, J. M. (2009). The relationship between 
corporate social responsibility and shareholder value: An empirical test of the risk 
management hypothesis. Strategic Management Journal 30:4, 425–445. 
Gregory, A., Matatko, J., Luther, R., (1997). Ethical unit trust financial performance: 
small company effects and fund size effects. Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting 24:5, 705–724. 
Gregory, A., and Whittaker, J., (2007). Performance and performance persistence of 
‘ethical’ unit trusts in the UK. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 34:7–8, 
45 
  
 
1327–1344. 
Hamilton, S., Jo, H., Statman, M., (1993). Doing well while doing good? The investment 
performance of socially responsible mutual funds. Financial Analysts Journal 49:6, 
62–66. 
Hawken (2004). Natural Capital Institute: Socially Responsible Investing. [online]. ]. 
[Cited 05.12.2016]. Available from World Wide Web: 
<URL:http://www.resbonsibleinvesting.com.htm>. 
Hong, Harrison & Marcin Kacperczyk (2009). The price of sin: The effects of social 
norms on markets. Journal of Financial Economics 93, 15–36. 
Huimin, Li, Adrian Cheung & Eduardo Roca (2010). Socially Responsible Investment in 
Good and Bad Times. International Research Journal of Finance and Economics 
54, 152–165. 
ICB (2016). Industry classification benchmark [online]. [Cited 12.12.2016]. Available 
from the World Wide Web: <URL: 
http://www.ftse.com/products/downloads/FTSE_Cyclical_and_Defensive_Index_S
eries.pdf?32> 
Jensen, M. C. (1968). The performance of mutual funds in the period 1945–1964. The 
Journal of finance 23:2, 389–416. 
Kempf, Alexander & Peer Osthoff (2007). The Effect of Socially Responsible Investing 
on Portfolio Performance. European Financial Management 13:5, 908–922. 
Kim, Y., Li, H., & Li, S. (2014). Corporate social responsibility and stock price crash risk. 
Journal of Banking & Finance, 43, 1–13. 
Kreander, N., Gray, G., Power, D.M., Sinclair, C.D., (2005). Evaluating the performance 
of ethical and non–SRI funds: a matched pair analysis. Journal of Business Finance 
and Accounting 32:7, 1465–1493. 
La Porta, R., Lopez–de–Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2008). The economic consequences 
of legal origins. Journal of economic literature 46:2, 285–332. 
Leite, P., & Cortez, M. C. (2014). Style and performance of international socially 
responsible funds in Europe. Research in International Business and Finance 30, 
248–267. 
46 
  
 
Luther, R.G., and Matatko, J., Corner, D., (1992). The investment performance of UK 
ethical unit trusts. Accounting Auditing and Accountability Journal 5:4, 57–70. 
Malkamäki, Markku (1990). Rahoitusmarkkinat. Ed. Markku Malkamäki & Teppo 
Martikainen. Jyväskylä: Gummerus Kirjapaino Oy. 328 p. ISBN 951–35–4983–6.  
Malkiel, Burton (2003). The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 17:1. 59–82.  
Mallin, C.A., Saadouni, B., Briston, R.J., (1995). The financial performance of ethical 
investment funds. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 22:4, 483–496. 
Mitton, T. (2002). A cross–firm analysis of the impact of corporate governance on the 
East Asian financial crisis. Journal of financial economics 64.2, 215–241. 
Moskowitz, M. (1972). Choosing socially responsible stocks. Business and society review 
1, 71–75. 
MSCI (2017). MSCI – End of the day data country [online]. [cited 04.02.2017]. Available 
from the World Wide Web: <URL: https://www.msci.com/end–of–day–data–
country/> 
NASA (2017). Global climate change [online]. [cited 27.01.2017]. Available from the 
World Wide Web: <URL: http://climate.nasa.gov/effects/> 
NASDAQ a (2016). Shares – share prices for all companies listed on NASDAQ Nordic 
[online]. [cited 28.11.2016]. Available from the World Wide Web: <URL: 
http://www.nasdaqomxnordic.com/shares> 
NASDAQ b (2016). Industries, Segment and Indexes [online]. [cited 28.11.2016]. 
Available from the World Wide Web: <URL: 
http://business.nasdaq.com/list/listing–options/European–Markets/nordic–main–
market/industries–segment–indexes> 
Nikkinen, J., Rothovius, T., & Sahlström, P. (2002). Arvopaperisijoittaminen. 1st 39 
edition. Helsinki: WSOY. ISBN 951–0–26627–2. 
Novy–Marx, R. (2013). The other side of value: The gross profitability premium. Journal 
of Financial Economics 108(1), 1–28. 
Orlitzky. M., F. Schmidt & S. Rynes (2004). Corporate Social and Financial Performance: 
A Meta–Analysis. Organization Studies 403–441.  
47 
  
 
Principles of Responsible Investing (2016). [online]. [cited 10.1.2017]. Available from 
World Wide Web: <URL:https://www.unpri.org/about> 
Renneboog, L., Horst, J.T., Zhang, C., (2008). The price of ethics and stakeholder 
governance: The performance of socially responsible mutual funds. Journal of 
Corporate Finance 14:3, 302–322. 
Ritter, J. R. (1991). The long‐run performance of initial public offerings. The journal of 
finance 46:1, 3–27. 
RobecoSAM (2016). [online]. [cited 10.11.2016]. Available from the World Wide Web: 
<URL: http://www.sustainability–indices.com/> 
Scholtens, B., & Sievänen, R. (2013). Drivers of socially responsible investing: A case 
study of four Nordic countries. Journal of business ethics 115:3, 605–616. 
Schröder, Michael (2004). The performance of socially responsible investments: 
investment funds and indices. Financial Markets and Portfolio Management 18:2, 
122–142. 
Schröder, Michael (2005). Is there a Difference? The Performance Characteristics of SRI 
Equity Indexes. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 34:1–2, 331– 348. 
Schueth, Steve (2003). Socially Responsible Investing in the United States. Journal of 
Business Ethics 43:3, 189–194. 
Sharpe, William. Gordon Alexander & Jeffery Bailey (1999). Investments. 6. ed. London: 
Prentice–Hall International, Inc. 962 p. ISBN 0–13–010130–3. 
Souto, B. F. F. (2009). Crisis and corporate social responsibility: threat or opportunity?. 
International Journal of Economic Sciences and Applied Research 1, 36–50. 
Statistics from NASDAQ (2017). [online]. [cited 16.3.2017]. Available from the World 
Wide Web: 
<https://newsclient.omxgroup.com/cdsPublic/viewDisclosure.action?disclosureId=
752709&lang=en> 
Statman, M., (2000). Socially responsible mutual funds. Financial Analysts Journal 56, 
30–38. 
Statman, M., (2006). Socially Responsible Indexes. Journal of Portfolio Management, 
32:3, 100–109. 
48 
  
 
STOXX (2016). [online]. [cited 11.10.2016]. Available from the World Wide Web: 
<URL: https://www.stoxx.com/index–details?symbol=SXWESGP> 
Sustainalytics (2016). [online]. [cited 4.11.2016]. Available from the World Wide Web: 
<URL: http://www.sustainalytics.com/> 
S&P Dow Jones Indices (2016). [online]. [cited 5.11.2016]. Available from the World 
Wide Web: <URL: http://www.djindexes.com/sustainability/> 
UNEP (2017). [online]. [cited 14.3.2017]. Available from the World Wide Web: <URL: 
http://www.unepfi.org/events/regions-events/europe-events/first-western-
european-forum/> 
USSIF (2014). Report on US Sustainable, Responsible and Impact Investing Trends 
(2014). [online]. [cited 17.12.2016]. Available from World Wide Web: 
<URL:http://www.ussif.org/Files/Publications/SIF_Trends_14.F.ES.pdfUSSIF's> 
USSIF (2016). SRI basics. [online]. [cited 20.12.2016]. Available from World Wide Web: 
<URL: http://www.ussif.org/sribasics > 
 
 
  
49 
  
 
APPENDIX 
1. The ESG and the non–ESG portfolios by pairs. 
 
The ESG and the non–ESG portfolio pairs  
Industry ESG portfolio  Non–ESG portfolio   
ICB Name and series Country Name and series Country Date added 
1700 STORA ENSO 'R'  FI METSA BOARD 'B' FI 12/2004 
1700 UPM–KYMMENE FI HOLMEN 'B' SWE 12/2004 
1700 BOLIDEN SWE SSAB 'A' SWE 12/2004 
2300 ASSA ABLOY 'B'  SWE SWECO 'B'  SWE 12/2004 
2700 KONE 'B'  FI CARGOTEC 'B' FI 6/2005 
2700 Metso FI INDUTRADE  SWE 12/2004 
2700 WARTSILA  FI ABB 'A'  SWE 12/2004 
2700 ALFA LAVAL  SWE FINGERPRINT CARDS 'B'  SWE 12/2004 
2700 ATLAS COPCO 'A' SWE DSV 'B' DEN 12/2004 
2700 SANDVIK  SWE LIFCO B  SWE 11/2014 
2700 SKF 'B'  SWE A P MOLLER 'B' DEN 12/2004 
2700 VOLVO 'B'  SWE NKT DEN 12/2004 
3500 CARLSBERG 'B' DEN ROYAL UNIBREW DEN 12/2004 
3700 ELECTROLUX 'B' SWE FISKARS 'A' FI 12/2004 
3700 SWEDISH MATCH  SWE DOMETIC GROUP  SWE 11/2015 
3700 SCA 'B'  SWE NOBIA SWE 12/2004 
4500 COLOPLAST 'B' DEN H LUNDBECK  DEN 12/2004 
4500 NOVO NORDISK 'B' DEN NOVOZYMES DEN 12/2004 
4500 
CHR HANSEN 
HOLDING DEN WILLIAM DEMANT HLDG DEN 5/2010 
6500 TDC DEN COM HEM HOLDINGS  SWE 6/2014 
8300 DANSKE BANK DEN SAMPO 'A'  FI 12/2004 
8300 NORDEA BANK  SWE LATOUR INVESTMENT 'B' SWE 12/2004 
8300 SEB 'A' SWE 
LUNDBERGFORETAGEN 
'B' SWE 12/2004 
8300 
SVENSKA 
HANDBKN.'A'  SWE RATOS 'B' SWE 12/2004 
8300 SWEDBANK 'A' SWE WALLENSTAM 'B' SWE 12/2004 
8500 TRYG DEN TOPDANMARK DEN 9/2005 
9500 NOKIA  FI TIETO OYJ FI 12/2004 
9500 ERICSSON 'B'  SWE AXIS SWE 12/2004 
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2. Number of companies from each industry in the portfolios. (ICB Rules 2016.) 
 
Number of pairs from each industry 
 
ICB 
Name of the supersector 
Number of companies 
1700 Basic resources 3 
2300 Construction & Materials 1 
2700 Industrial goods & services 8 
3500 Food & Beverages 1 
3700 
Personal & Household goods 
3 
4500 Health care 3 
6500 Telecommunications 1 
8300 Banks 5 
8500 Insurance 1 
9500 Technology 2 
SUM 
 
28 
The following supersector are not included in the study due to data limitations and/or lack 
of stocks passing the criteria to be added in to the ESG portfolio: 1300 Chemicals, 3300 
Automobiles & Parts, 5300 Retail, 5500 Media, 5700 Travel & Leisure, 7500 Utilities, 
8600 Real Estate.  
 
 
 
3. Number of stocks in the portfolios according to the country of origin.  
Stocks by country   
ESG Stocks 
SWE 15 
FIN 6 
DEN 7 
Non–ESG Stocks 
SWE 15 
FIN 5 
DEN 8 
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4. Heteroscedasticity test: White. First the ESG portfolio followed by the non–ESG 
portfolio.  
Heteroskedasticity Test: White      
F-statistic 7.886997     Prob. F(20,121) 0.0000 
Obs*R-squared 80.35831     Prob. Chi-Square(20) 0.0000 
Scaled explained SS 174.6911     Prob. Chi-Square(20) 0.0000 
Test Equation:      
Dependent Variable: RESID^2     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 03/12/17   Time: 17:14     
Sample: 2005M01 2016M10     
Included observations: 142     
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.848027 1.477578 0.573930 0.5671 
MKT_RF^2 0.116618 0.072005 1.619588 0.1079 
MKT_RF*HML -0.285543 0.367861 -0.776227 0.4391 
MKT_RF*SMB -0.018788 0.175172 -0.107255 0.9148 
MKT_RF*RMW 0.222732 0.301223 0.739428 0.4611 
MKT_RF*CMA 0.543655 0.368149 1.476727 0.1423 
MKT_RF 0.218664 0.278227 0.785919 0.4335 
HML^2 1.079928 0.630013 1.714136 0.0891 
HML*SMB 0.093350 0.617659 0.151135 0.8801 
HML*RMW 0.297544 1.309206 0.227270 0.8206 
HML*CMA -3.910293 1.360528 -2.874100 0.0048 
HML 1.358729 1.086388 1.250685 0.2135 
SMB^2 -0.036238 0.275843 -0.131372 0.8957 
SMB*RMW 0.227883 0.656406 0.347168 0.7291 
SMB*CMA -0.252911 0.775777 -0.326010 0.7450 
SMB 0.585128 0.530709 1.102540 0.2724 
RMW^2 0.447346 0.789399 0.566692 0.5720 
RMW*CMA -1.490890 1.241297 -1.201074 0.2321 
RMW 1.196635 1.035479 1.155635 0.2501 
CMA^2 1.332232 0.755226 1.764019 0.0803 
CMA -2.595432 1.688414 -1.537202 0.1269 
R-squared 0.565904  Mean dependent var 7.129058 
Adjusted R-squared 0.494152  S.D. dependent var 15.57583 
S.E. of regression 11.07799  Akaike info criterion 7.783537 
Sum squared resid 14849.36  Schwarz criterion 8.220666 
Log likelihood -531.6311  Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.961168 
F-statistic 7.886997  Durbin-Watson stat 2.253088 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000       
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Heteroskedasticity Test: White       
F-statistic 11.99105     Prob. F(20,121) 0.0000 
Obs*R-squared 94.38083     Prob. Chi-Square(20) 0.0000 
Scaled explained SS 220.1420     Prob. Chi-Square(20) 0.0000 
Test Equation:         
Dependent Variable: RESID^2     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 03/12/17   Time: 17:22     
Sample: 2005M01 2016M10     
Included observations: 142     
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 0.552704 1.536769 0.359653 0.7197 
MKT_RF^2 0.121285 0.061285 1.979027 0.0501 
MKT_RF*HML -0.342667 0.313309 -1.093705 0.2763 
MKT_RF*SMB 0.000941 0.184286 0.005106 0.9959 
MKT_RF*RMW 0.010974 0.323106 0.033965 0.9730 
MKT_RF*CMA 0.741438 0.313110 2.367978 0.0195 
MKT_RF 0.070389 0.311316 0.226101 0.8215 
HML^2 1.090597 0.604677 1.803602 0.0738 
HML*SMB 0.191747 0.563660 0.340182 0.7343 
HML*RMW -0.950128 1.460697 -0.650462 0.5166 
HML*CMA -4.201651 1.372812 -3.060617 0.0027 
HML 2.583669 1.334104 1.936632 0.0551 
SMB^2 0.026635 0.271279 0.098185 0.9219 
SMB*RMW 0.122113 0.644481 0.189475 0.8500 
SMB*CMA -0.171687 0.690639 -0.248591 0.8041 
SMB 1.015672 0.597529 1.699787 0.0917 
RMW^2 -1.021154 0.898932 -1.135963 0.2582 
RMW*CMA -0.672729 1.366964 -0.492133 0.6235 
RMW 1.352507 1.209433 1.118299 0.2657 
CMA^2 2.254997 0.748859 3.011245 0.0032 
CMA -3.489254 2.028441 -1.720165 0.0880 
R-squared 0.664654  Mean dependent var 8.236794 
Adjusted R-squared 0.609225  S.D. dependent var 18.64090 
S.E. of regression 11.65280  Akaike info criterion 7.884709 
Sum squared resid 16430.33  Schwarz criterion 8.321838 
Log likelihood -538.8143  Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.062341 
F-statistic 11.99105  Durbin-Watson stat 2.091828 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000       
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5. Breusch–Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test. First the results for the ESG 
portfolio followed by the results for the non–ESG portfolio.  
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:     
F-statistic 0.302157     Prob. F(2,134) 0.7397 
Obs*R-squared 0.637518     Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.7271 
Test Equation:      
Dependent Variable: RESID     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 03/12/17   Time: 17:29     
Sample: 2005M01 2016M10     
Included observations: 142     
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero.   
Variable Coefficient 
Std. 
Error t-Statistic Prob.   
MKT_RF 0.004266 0.058606 0.072791 0.9421 
HML 0.011399 0.189374 0.060192 0.9521 
SMB -0.000133 0.132548 -0.001002 0.9992 
RMW 0.015572 0.257580 0.060455 0.9519 
CMA 0.012287 0.206124 0.059608 0.9526 
C -0.008560 0.258080 -0.033166 0.9736 
RESID(-1) -0.045131 0.090018 -0.501362 0.6169 
RESID(-2) 0.049329 0.086898 0.567659 0.5712 
R-squared 0.004490 Mean dependent var -1.78E-16 
Adjusted R-squared -0.047515 S.D. dependent var 2.679481 
S.E. of regression 2.742400 Akaike info criterion 4.910233 
Sum squared resid 1007.781 Schwarz criterion 5.076758 
Log likelihood -340.6265 Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.977902 
F-statistic 0.086331 Durbin-Watson stat 1.983897 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.998912       
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Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:     
F-statistic 3.718332     Prob. F(2,134) 0.0268 
Obs*R-squared 7.466283     Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0239 
Test Equation:      
Dependent Variable: RESID     
Method: Least Squares     
Date: 03/12/17   Time: 17:44     
Sample: 2005M01 2016M10     
Included observations: 142     
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero.   
Variable Coefficient 
Std. 
Error t-Statistic Prob.   
MKT_RF 0.020678 0.061585 0.335758 0.7376 
HML -0.040875 0.198543 -0.205876 0.8372 
SMB 0.025568 0.140057 0.182553 0.8554 
RMW 0.044452 0.270084 0.164584 0.8695 
CMA 0.066665 0.218684 0.304846 0.7610 
C -0.031578 0.271072 -0.116493 0.9074 
RESID(-1) -0.185381 0.087614 -2.115869 0.0362 
RESID(-2) -0.173212 0.085758 -2.019773 0.0454 
R-squared 0.052579 Mean dependent var -1.00E-16 
Adjusted R-squared 0.003087 S.D. dependent var 2.880141 
S.E. of regression 2.875691 Akaike info criterion 5.005152 
Sum squared resid 1108.127 Schwarz criterion 5.171678 
Log likelihood -347.3658 Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.072821 
F-statistic 1.062380 Durbin-Watson stat 1.930219 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.391268       
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6. The FF five factor regression results. These result are NOT corrected with HAC 
standard errors and covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey–West fixed) for serial 
correlation and heteroscedasticity.  
 
Regression result from 2002M12 to 2016M10 
  a MKT SMB HML RMW CMA R2 
ESG 
 
0.386 
(1.54) 
1.100*** 
(19.64) 
0.142 
(1.10) 
0.162 
(0.88) 
0.097 
(0.39) 
-0.540** 
(-2.67) 
0.857 
 
Non–ESG 
 
0.620*** 
(2.30) 
1.105*** 
(18.30) 
0.800*** 
(5.75) 
0.107 
(0.54) 
0.023 
(0.08) 
-0.374* 
(1.74) 
0.841 
 
Difference 
 
-0.235 
(-1.08) 
-0.002 
(-0.03) 
-0.656 
(-5.90) 
0.055 
(0.35) 
0.074 
(0.34) 
-0.163 
(0.93) 
0.213 
 
The general FF five factor result for the whole time period. The stars indicate statistical significance: *** 
at 1%, ** at 5%, *** at 10% level. . The results are in basis points. The t-Statistics are in the parentheses. 
 
 
 
FF five factor regression result with split sample     
    a MKT SMB HML RMW CMA R2 
ESG 
Before Crisis 
 
0.621 
(1.36) 
1.304*** 
(9.94) 
-0.024 
(-0.10) 
-0.618 
(-1.20) 
-0.958* 
(-2.29) 
-0.658 
(-1.43) 
0.824 
 
  
During Crisis 
 
-0.313 
(-0.39) 
0.956*** 
(5.97) 
0.228 
(0.66) 
0.669 
(1.09) 
0.528 
(0.62) 
-0.448 
(-0.86) 
0.863 
 
  
After Crisis 
 
0.407 
(1.23) 
1.136*** 
(16.27) 
0.183 
(1.05) 
0.245 
(1.12) 
0.249 
(0.82) 
-0.702** 
(-2.70) 
0.846 
 
Non–ESG 
Before Crisis 
 
1.204*** 
(2.11) 
1.428*** 
(8.71) 
0.220 
(0.77) 
-0.112 
(-1.73) 
-0.778 
(-1.50) 
-0.630 
(-1.09) 
0.776 
 
  
During Crisis 
 
-1.06 
(-1.38) 
0.696*** 
(4.58) 
0.459 
(1.41) 
0.038 
(0.07) 
-0.418 
(-0.52) 
-1.010* 
(-2.06) 
0.865 
 
  
After Crisis 
 
0.625* 
(1.86) 
1.180*** 
(16.70) 
0.907*** 
(5.13) 
0.226 
(1.02) 
0.247 
(0.80) 
-0.516* 
(-1.95) 
0.851 
 
Difference 
Before Crisis 
 
-0.582 
(-1.20) 
-0.119 
(-0.85) 
-0.256 
(-0.99) 
-0.497 
(0.90) 
-0.019 
(-0.41) 
-0.028 
(-0.06) 
0.080 
 
  
During Crisis 
 
0.748 
(0.80) 
0.259 
(1.40) 
-0.232 
(-0.57) 
0.631 
(0.89) 
0.946 
(0.96) 
0.560 
(0.93) 
0.297 
 
  
After Crisis 
 
-0.219 
(-0.94) 
-0.044 
(-0.90) 
-0.724*** 
(-5.88) 
0.018 
(0.12) 
0.002 
(0.02) 
-0.187 
(-1.02) 
0.299 
 
The FF five factor split sample results. The stars indicate statistical significance: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, *** 
at 10% level.  The results are in basis points. The t-Statistics are in the parentheses. 
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